1 There are, of course, very good reasons to attend to art and nature: artworks and natural environments can give rise to magnificent aesthetic experiences. However, unless art and nature are construed quite broadly, they play a comparatively small role in many of our everyday lives. This is especially true of the fine art that is encountered in museums, theatres and symphony halls, which tends to dominate aesthetic discussions of art.
If aesthetic experience really were restricted to encounters with art and nature, it would be the case that those of us who live and work in urban and suburban environments that are not very thoroughly art-infused live lives rather lacking in aesthetic texture. But I submit that this is false: our everyday lives have an aesthetic character that is thoroughgoing and available at every moment, should Pervasiveness -2 we choose to attend to it. The relative neglect of the domain of the everyday within the discipline of aesthetics is unfortunate, for this domain offers the prospect of significant satisfactions that are different in character from those available from experiences of art and nature, and that do not require travel to art galleries, nature preserves or other special sites.
In section I, I give several examples that will inform the succeeding discussion. In section II, I address the most general and well-developed existing account of the possibility of aesthetic experience in everyday life, namely that offered by Dewey in Art as Experience. I discuss Dewey's distinction between mere experience, which necessarily lacks aesthetic character, and an experience, which may be aesthetic in nature. I draw out the criteria for an experience that are implicit in Dewey's account, and discuss the ways in which my examples fail to satisfy these criteria. In section III, I discuss Dewey's criteria related to conscious awareness, and argue that the limitations on conscious awareness of everyday experiences do not rule out their having an aesthetic character. In section IV, I discuss Dewey's structural criteria, namely unity, closure and complexity. I consider two different ways in which unity and closure may be understood, and argue that only the weaker senses, which are satisfied by my examples, are relevant to whether or not an experience is aesthetic. In relation to complexity, I suggest that while it may often contribute to the positive aesthetic character of an experience, it is not a necessary condition for an experience's having an aesthetic character at all.
In sections V and VI, I defend the importance of the present inquiry, suggesting that aesthetic attention to everyday experience is likely not only to result in more satisfying lives but also to contribute to our ability to sustain projects undertaken in the pursuit of moral and other values.
I. Aesthetic Considerations in Everyday Life
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What kind of role do aesthetic considerations play in everyday life? At the most concrete level, which will primarily concern me in this discussion, particular moments and local experiences have an aesthetic quality about them. Being in the room you are in right now, with its particular visual features and sounds; sitting the way that you're sitting, perhaps crookedly in an uncomfortable chair; feeling the air currents on your skin; all of these things impart a texture to your experience which, I will argue, should be regarded as aesthetic.
To illustrate the discussion, let me describe a few things I have discovered I 2 While walking down my dirt road, I study the various colours of the dirt and the tire tracks that weave along it, and I contemplate how nice it would be to have a suit made out of a fabric with these gradations, with a subtle pattern that varies in texture and doesn't run too straight. I drink tea out of a large mug that is roughly egg-shaped, and I clasp it with both hands to warm my palms. When I am petting my cat, I crouch over his body so that I can smell his fur, which at different places smells like trapped sunshine or roasted nuts, a bit like almonds but not quite. I scratch my head with a mechanical pencil that allows me to part my hair and reach exactly the right spot on my scalp. I move my wedding ring back and forth over the knuckle that offers it slight resistance, and I jiggle it around in my right palm to enjoy its weight before sliding it back on.
The experiences and behaviours that I have described vary somewhat in complexity. Some of them involve conscious enjoyment; some involve simply entering into a terminological debate over the reasonableness of using 'aesthetic' in such an exclusive way, which would take me too far from the topic that primarily concerns me here, I will engage a more sympathetic interlocutor who would nonetheless hold that the experiences I have described cannot be aesthetic. This will allow me to make more direct headway on the question whether, and on what grounds, a wide variety of everyday experiences should be seen as having an aesthetic character.
The most extensive and detailed account of the domain that concerns me here was put forward by Dewey in Art as Experience. Dewey argues that the aesthetic aspects of art and those of everyday life lie on a continuum. However, as
we will see, Dewey offers a set of criteria for aesthetic experience that exclude most or all of the examples introduced above. Dewey does not argue for these criteria or
give a clear account of why he favours them; his primary approach is to offer examples of experiences that satisfy the criteria and experiences that do not, in the Pervasiveness -5 expectation that the reader will agree that the former are aesthetic while the latter cannot be. Dewey's discussion is of interest in part because it reflects a number of common and reasonable intuitions about the boundaries of the aesthetic. I will isolate the particular criteria that emerge from Dewey's account and identify the most plausible rationale for regarding each as a necessary condition for aesthetic experience. I will then argue that the criteria, as they ought to be understood, do not rule out everyday experiences like those I have described; and, indeed, that there are strong reasons to include such experiences within the realm of the aesthetic.
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II. Dewey and the Notion of an Experience
Dewey holds that the capacity for aesthetic experiences of art arises out of basic mechanisms, present even in animals, that are employed throughout everyday life.
We are in a continual process, Dewey notes, of falling out of sync with our environments-whenever we are hungry, cold, tired, afraid, or in pain-and regaining our sense of union and harmony. We continually detect signs of dissatisfaction or discomfort within ourselves and attempt to alleviate that discomfort. When we achieve 'an adjustment of our whole being to the conditions of existence,' we experience 'a fulfillment that reaches to the depths of our being'. 5 Aesthetic experience is an outgrowth of processes of perception, activity and emotion that allow for such fulfilment.
While defending the continuity of aesthetic and everyday experience, Dewey is also concerned to acknowledge the distinctness of the aesthetic, and to demarcate it from that out of which it emerges. In this spirit, he introduces the concepts of mere experience and an experience, suggesting that only when one has an experience can one's experience have a truly aesthetic quality. To be susceptible of having aesthetic qualities, then, one's experience must have clear boundaries and a certain kind of structure: there must be a degree of complexity (since there is a perception of relationships among the elements of the experience), an overarching unity (which may be supplied, at least in part, by the quality of the experiencer's attention), and a sense of culmination or building toward a satisfying close that is anticipated in advance.
Pervasiveness -7
Regarding most of my examples, it seems implausible to suggest that a special unifying quality is present, that there is some kind of culmination or that energies have run their proper course. If there is anything that gives these examples a sense of closure, it is that my attention turns away from the moment of experience and moves on to something else. But sometimes the attention is only partially present in such cases; and very often it simply drifts away, rather than being consciously redirected in recognition that a circumscribed moment of experience has come to a close. Clearly, this is mere cessation rather than consummation in Dewey's terms. undergoing and doing' (p. 44). In order to be having an experience, then, one must perceive the relationships between doing and undergoing. 6 Clearly, the kind of perception involved is not merely sensory; it is a conscious, cognitive recognition of connections among elements. This sort of recognition seems to require that one's attention be rather fully directed toward what one is experiencing. Someone who is daydreaming or otherwise distracted while lifting the stone, then, cannot be having an experience (or, at least, not an experience of lifting the stone). There are three things to be said in response to this concern. First, even if it is sometimes true that sensing and adjusting is done automatically or unconsciously, it is not always the case. When, after a long bout of reading, I straighten my frame and enjoy a delicious sensation of stretching, this may be very consciously appreciated and adjusted so as to work out subtle areas of tension that have built up. The reciprocal relation of doing and undergoing is quite conscious: 'the action and its consequence' are 'joined in perception' (p. 44). And, of course, there is the possibility of bringing many things that are currently unconsciously undergone into consciousness, something that is advocated by many forms of meditative practice: it is possible for me to attend to the feeling of my fingers on the keyboard as I type, although I usually fail to do so. Attending to one's sensory experience is a form of mental discipline that can be learned, and can perhaps become as natural as ignoring that experience. Many aspects of our everyday experience, then, are already conscious in the way that Dewey requires; and others can be brought to consciousness.
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The first response focuses on the possibility of developing conscious awareness of one's sensory experience. A second response suggests that the development of such awareness may not be necessary for one's sensory experience to be aesthetically relevant. In psychological studies of unconscious cognition, such as the cocktail party effect, subjects listen to two streams of spoken language, one through each side of a pair of headphones, but are instructed to attend to only one.
Though the subjects report having little or no awareness of what was said on the side they were not attending to, statistical evidence shows that they use the information presented on the ignored side to disambiguate words and phrases on the side they are actively listening to. 7 This form of cognitive processing has clear aesthetic implications: if unconscious experience can affect our understanding of utterance meanings, it can contribute to the aesthetic character of what is consciously experienced (since, as the case of literature informs us, meaning can be highly aesthetically relevant).
Similar effects may be quite common in everyday life: information which we are not aware of processing contributes to the tenor of our experience, and even to the nature of our activity, in the reciprocal relationship of doing and undergoing. I see no reason to deny that this may be an aesthetic phenomenon, since it seems that something similar may be true in an experience of art: even when we are attending quite carefully, the complexity of the experience may be such that some elements will fail to be consciously noticed, but will still contribute to the overall aesthetic effect. In film, the fact that the camera is zooming in very slowly on the face of a character may contribute strongly to a sense of heightened tension or To be closed in the strong sense, an entity must satisfy an additional criterion: it must not only be bounded but also, as Dewey describes, exhibit development and culmination of the material within those boundaries. There is also a strong sense of unity: it is the sense in which elements not only must be bound together within clearly defined limits but also must exhibit qualitative similarities. It is clear that Dewey thinks closure and unity in the strong senses are required for something to count as an experience.
One reason for requiring closure and unity, in aesthetic contexts, would be to Pervasiveness -13 secure the potential objectivity of aesthetic judgments. If one is to make aesthetic judgments that have a claim to correctness and shareability, it seems that those judgments must be directed at a clearly delimited entity. It has also frequently been observed that which aesthetic qualities an entity will appear to have depends on the way in which that entity is framed; to change the boundaries around a natural scene, for instance, may change the aesthetic qualities that both the scene as a whole and particular items within it are seen to have. For the purposes of framing and securing the objectivity of aesthetic judgment, only closure and unity in the first, weaker senses are required. Even if the elements within some boundary are quite diverse, exhibiting no unifying quality and no development toward a moment of consummation, one can aesthetically evaluate the bounded entity as a whole: it might appear to be fragmented, discordant or chaotic.
When Dewey invokes closure and unity in the stronger senses, I believe he must be seen as doing something more than simply securing the preconditions for an aesthetic characterization of experience. For closure and unity in the stronger senses are, themselves, aesthetic qualities that an entity clearly subject to aesthetic assessment may have or lack. Some films build to a moment of consummation like that described by Dewey; others may resist any kind of resolution. One theatrical piece might be stylistically unified, with a single, clear plot into which all elements are obviously integrated; another might consist of a series of vignettes with little or no stylistic or thematic cohesiveness. Unity and closure, in the stronger senses, have often been thought necessary for an entity to warrant positive aesthetic evaluation, and they are qualities to which many artists aspire in their work. Thus, entities that exhibit these qualities are perhaps more likely to seem in candidacy for aesthetic consideration even by those suspicious of Dewey's project. However, this does nothing to show that being closed and unified in these senses is necessary for having an aesthetic character at all, or even for having a positive aesthetic Ultimately, though, we should reject closure and unity even in the weak senses as conditions for an experience to count as aesthetic. Closure and unity do have an important role to play in aesthetic contexts: they are necessary to secure To see this point, consider the experience of a piece of music one has never heard before. It would be prudent to withhold aesthetic judgment about the piece, and even about particular elements of it, until one has heard it through; a particular passage might seem soothing and peaceful during an initial listen, but come to seem foreboding once its relation to subsequent passages is known. However, the piece and its particular passages are experienced as having an aesthetic character even as they unfold for the first time. One can, then, have an aesthetic experience even when that experience does not directly track the aesthetic features that the object of experience will eventually be judged to have. Neither a piece of music nor the experience of it begins to have a felt aesthetic quality only when it has ended.
For similar reasons, it is unclear that any fixed boundary around an experience is required for that experience to have an aesthetic character. Even if the frame is continually shifting, as new relationships and saliencies attract the attention of the perceptual system, this means only that the aesthetic character of the experience will shift accordingly; not, again, that such character will be absent.
In addition to the structural requirements related to unity and closure, Dewey's account yields an implicit requirement related to complexity, as he requires that relationships between doing and undergoing be joined in perception. Another worry, then, concerns the fact that the examples I have offered seem too simple for aesthetic considerations to be relevant. I am petting the cat, I lower my face to his fur and enjoy the smell, period. End of story. Even if we do not seek narrative culmination, or closure, we might be inclined to demand that an experience be more Pervasiveness -16 complex than this for aesthetic concepts to apply to it. Many discussions of the aesthetic relevance of smell or taste have focused on the fact that it is possible to adopt an attitude of connoisseurship or sophistication with respect to them: to learn to draw fine olfactory or gustatory distinctions, to incorporate elements of smell or taste in complex structures, and so forth. 8 In my encounter with the cat, little of this is happening. I do not go on to position the cat's smell in a careful taxonomy of scents encountered in my daily experience, or (thankfully, one might say) to create a fashionable new scent, Eau de chat, in which I capture a selection of the scents the cat emits and place them in some relation to one another.
But surely the actual placement of elements within a complex structure is not necessary for the elements to be considered aesthetically. A monochrome painting has aesthetic impact even though it is about as simple as a painting can be, and this is not only because of the way in which it shocks by eschewing the project of showing patent relations of colours and forms that preoccupied its historical predecessors. Simplicity and complexity lie on an aesthetically relevant spectrum of properties; simplicity can itself be an aesthetic quality, and can contribute to the aesthetic merit of an artwork. The fact that an experience is simple, then, cannot disqualify it from having an aesthetic character.
Moreover, the appearance of simplicity may be a figment of the way I have described the examples. When I lower my face into my cat's fur, my experience has subtle tactile, olfactory, auditory, visual and emotional components. If I am alive to all these elements of the experience, what I grasp may in fact be quite complex. In consequence, we should reject the suggestion that experiences of the sort I have described fail a complexity test that must be passed if something is to count as an object of aesthetic attention.
V. The Importance of Aesthetic Attention to the Everyday
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I have argued at some length that certain little things, which we often hardly notice and may be inclined to dismiss as trivial, are worthy of the application of aesthetic concepts. What is the point of this? Why is it important to recognize the pervasive presence of aesthetic considerations in everyday life? There are a number of answers to this. Some of them are evident in the writings of Richard Shusterman.
The first has to do, quite simply, with self-knowledge. 9 Insofar as we think that selfknowledge is worth striving for, philosophically and personally, we should attend to the minor moments of experience that supply much of the texture of our lives. And we should acknowledge that most of life is, in fact, made up of minor moments.
Additional reasons for exploring this domain are both hedonic and moral. We deserve better than to have our ordinary pleasures, the ones which animate our dayto-day existence, dismissed as insignificant, and our ability to appreciate them accordingly diminished. As Shusterman suggests in relationship to popular art forms, in dismissing them '[w]e are made to disdain the things which give us pleasure and to feel ashamed of the pleasure they give', which amounts to an unwarranted 'ascetic renunciation'. 10 The same applies to everyday life: insofar as we are led to ignore it or regard it as unworthy of attention, we deprive ourselves of a source of gratification. If we attend to the aesthetic aspects of everyday experience, our lives can come to seem more satisfying to us, even more profound. And, of course, through attention we may learn to build upon and enhance the aesthetic character of experience.
There are also moral reasons for attending to the aesthetic aspects of daily experience. At first glance, this might seem a bit mysterious: Michael Slote has suggested that 'our ordinary thinking about morality assigns no positive value to the well-being or happiness of the moral agent of the sort it clearly assigns to the wellbeing or happiness of everyone other than the agent'. lives, and are perpetually seeking after some outside stimulus, often a consumer product, to complete them. 12 But the acquisition of this product does not solve the problem; it provides, at best, a short-lived and partial pleasure, and then raises the bar even higher for future stimuli. 13 This continually escalating pursuit of material things has a number of pernicious effects. Notably, it leads to exhaustion of natural resources and harm to the environment, as we shelve or throw away goods that are still in working order and seek after ever bigger and shinier and faster symbols of status. It also leads to the hoarding of resources: since we always feel that we need more and better to be satisfied, we never feel that we have more than we need; thus we never arrive at a level at which we feel confident that we can afford to give something away to help meet the basic needs of others.
Peter Singer's prescription is that we abandon the quest for satisfactions derived from material goods and apply our energy to helping others instead. 14 perhaps we will be less inclined to think that we must acquire new goods that make different experiences available. Perhaps we can discover that we already have enough, or even more than we need, to be satisfied; and this might make room for giving something-time, energy, or money-away.
VI. Harnessing the Aesthetic in Service of the Moral
One way in which the aesthetic character of everyday life has moral significance, then, is that attending to this aesthetic character may reduce our tendency to cause harm in attempts to satisfy our needs. There is also a more straightforward way in which aesthetic considerations may be relevant to ethical performance, and it is to this that I turn in the present section.
Morality is often thought of as a matter of sacrifice. To satisfy negative duties that enjoin us against harming others is a matter of giving up opportunities to do as we please. Becoming a moral vegetarian, in recognition of the fact that animals are often caused great suffering in industrial meat production, involves renouncing foods that may have given one great pleasure, as well as a convenient source of nutrition.
To satisfy positive duties that require us to help others involves giving up time, money or other resources we might have used to secure our own benefit. The hours one spends doing volunteer work are hours that cannot be spent reading novels in the hammock or taking bubble baths, and the money one sends to Oxfam is money that cannot be spent on new rims for the sports car or left to accrue interest in the retirement account.
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It is evident, I think, that this element of sacrifice plays a significant role in inhibiting moral activity. As a moral vegetarian myself, I have had many conversations with people who say that they are aware of the relevant facts and recognize the moral force of the arguments in favour of vegetarianism, but simply can't bring themselves to comply. Vegetarianism is construed as a simple case of sacrifice, of adopting a certain kind of asceticism which may seem both aesthetically distasteful and motivationally unsustainable.
Attention to the aesthetic character of everyday experience may substantially alleviate this problem. If we become more fully and explicitly conscious of how aesthetic considerations structure our choices, we are in a position to find ways to satisfy our aesthetic preferences while realizing our moral values more fully. Rather than viewing vegetarianism as a matter of giving things up, we can view it as a matter of finding different ways to indulge the tastes that were once satisfied by meat consumption. Rather than viewing volunteerism as a matter of giving up time one would have spent on pleasurable pursuits, we can view it as a matter of contributing in a way that satisfies our desires regarding the texture of our lives, whether this be through learning carpentry on a Habitat for Humanity project or cooking for the local homeless shelter. The ultimate moral viability of such an approach depends, of course, on the assumption that there are a variety of options for satisfying our moral duties, such that we can blamelessly select the one that is most suitable to our particular complex of preferences and tendencies. But even on a scheme that suggests there is often only one morally optimal alternative, it may still be possible to effect moral improvement by pursuing a sub-optimal alternative that satisfies one's aesthetic preferences. This is surely better than refraining from any attempt at moral improvement, as might otherwise happen.
The motivational effect under discussion is not, of course, exclusive to moral projects. Aesthetic considerations can be harnessed in support of any kind of Pervasiveness -21 project, moral or non-moral: taking care of one's health, becoming more knowledgeable about world history, improving one's parenting skills, and so forth. It is often possible to satisfy a variety of interests, aesthetic and otherwise, through a particular pattern of action. Because attending to our aesthetic preferences gives our lives a more satisfying texture, we are more likely to persist in any project that is undertaken with this dimension of experience in mind. Inquiry into the aesthetic character of everyday experience, then, holds the promise both of greater satisfaction and of more effective moral agency.
VII. Conclusion
I have argued that everyday experiences have an aesthetic character that is worthy of philosophical inquiry, despite the fact that these experiences may be simple, may lack unity or closure, and may contain elements of which we are less than fully conscious. Attending to this domain may enhance our self-knowledge, increase the availability of certain kinds of aesthetic satisfaction, and, in particular, provide motivational support for projects undertaken in pursuit of moral and other values. If we harness aesthetic considerations in the service of the moral, rather than simply ignoring the role of the aesthetic in motivating action or seeing morally charged situations in terms of bald conflict between what we want and what we should do, it seems very likely that this will enhance our willingness and ability to fulfil our moral duties and pursue moral goals. And surely we want to celebrate and embrace both aesthetic and moral value: it would be most unfortunate if we had to choose between goodness and aesthetic satisfaction, with no possibility of obtaining both.
With this discussion, I hope to have convinced you that this is not the situation that confronts us: the everyday moments of our lives are deeply and essentially aesthetic, and they can afford aesthetic satisfactions that promote moral activity. The bulk of analytic aesthetics would tend to send us to the art gallery or Dewey's discussion to shed light on the general question whether everyday experiences should be regarded as aesthetic. My treatment will be limited to those aspects of Dewey's account that are of greatest interest for this purpose.
